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HONG KONG CHALLENGE:
LEANING IN AND FACING OUT*
WangGungwu
It is a great privilege to be back in Hong Kong to speak
before such a distinguished gathering. Some of you may know
that I had recently put some thoughts down about the fITst
decade of the HKSAR for a conference at the CUHK that I was
not able to attend. That paper has now been published.
Although some of what I have to say today will touch on the
fITst decade, I shall not go over the same ground but concentrate
on Hong Kong's future opportunities in the Asia-Pacific that is
the theme of this seminar. I shall also not deal with the specifics
of the four critical issues of trade, finance, environment and
public health that you have identified for discussion in the
following sessions. You have many experts here to thrash out
those issues thoroughly.
What I shall do is to re-visit the question about Hong
Kong's place and role since the 1840s with regards to China and
the outside world. From the time the British made it a colony,
Hong Kong helped the British penetrate the China market and
bring new skills and technologies to the Chinese people. Even
the Chinese who moved from inland counties to the island
recognised that as the island's main role.. In time, individual
Hong Kong Chinese looked outwards but they were never
actively helped to do so, unlike their compatriots in Shanghai.
After 1949, following the fall of Shanghai as an international
city, Hong Kong took over Shanghai's mantle and its people
became open to the world. The people were gradually
encouraged to face outwards beyond China and beyond Britain
* This was a keynote paper presented at the seminar on "Hong Kong in the
Asia-Pacific Region - Issues and Opportunities" organised by the Central
Policy Unit of the HKSAR Government and the Centre of Asian Studies of the
University of Hong Kong on 23-24 November 2007.
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and adopt the world as a kind of fertile 'hinterland', and this
strengthened the colony's capacity to deal with a revolutionary
and ideologically driven China. By using the phrase 'leaning in'
in the title of this talk, I take it as given that Hong Kong has
always found it natural to lean inwards towards China; the fact
that the territory was recently returned to China makes that
even more true. But what are the consequences of this leaning
for Hong Kong's future as the relationship with the central
government becomes closer?
As for the phrase 'facing out', the question turns to Hong
Kong's position since 1949. In less than four decades, the
colony built itself pivotal roles by providing a bridge between
those who wanted.to build networks in China through and from
bases in Hong Kong and the Hong Kong people who developed
a world-view that enabled them to cope with the global market
economy and, what is more, become new models of modern
Chinese. In particular, compared with the period 1949-1997,
how much can Hong Kong today expe:tnd and refme its
relationships with the neighbouring region of Southeast Asia
and the strategic areas of the Asia-Pacific?
Hong Kong's history as a colony of the global British
maritime empire for over 155 years determined that the place
would have countless long-term links, both visible and invisible,
with all parts of that empire and, ultimately, with most of the
world. Now that it is an SAR and part of the PRC, what will
change when China becomes a global power? For decades after
the end of the Second World War, Hong Kong took on the
mantle of being the place for leaning in towards China while it
also faced outwards as an international city. This combination
was never contradictory. There is no doubt that both Hong
Kong government and people have shown that they could
manage it with style and aplomb, rather like a juggler dealing
with large number of objects in the air at one and the same time.
The range of Hong Kong's experiences with this level of leaning
in and facing out is very relevant to this seminar and I shall
explore what the reality was in the past and what that tells us
about the future.
.It is often forgotten that Guangzhou was the one port-city in
Chma that faced the world of the South China Sea and beyond
for over 2000 years. It did so from before the Qin-Han dynasties
to the First Opium War in the 19th century. This is an
extraordinary story because there are very few cities in the
world that have a continuous history of acting as a gateway for
a large hinterland. It is really impressive to see that the centre of
the early port-city of the earliest known kingdom of Nan Yue in
the 3rd century BC is still the heart of the city of Guangzhou
today. Under the Han, that city faced outwards and remained
China's gateway to the South China Sea for two millennia. As
long as that was so, there was no need for a place like Hong
Kong. In short, Hong Kong came about because from outside
Britain needed a base to help its merchants get ~to the market~
of th~ Qing emp.ire. Because of the success of Shanghai
followmg the openmg up of Central and North China after the
Se~o~d .Opium War, Hong Kong also became a key link for
Bntam m the trading chain to Shanghai's larger hinterland.
Guangzh.ou was eclip~ed by Shanghai, with Hong Kong acting
as an mstrument m strengthening Shanghai's position.
Something new had happened.
The coming of modern naval power also changed the nature
of the South and East China Seas. In earlier work, I have noted
the semi-Mediterranean conditions and called them the
Semiterranean Seas. You are familiar with the Mediterranean
complex whose history had led to great advances in the rise of
civilisations. Its ultimate product was the modern political
economy of Europe, and the maritime empires that reached the
shores of China. In that Mediterranean, over a period of three
millennia, there developed power relations that were based on
civilisational divides, on intense maritime trade and on
continual wars. In contrast, in the South and East China Seas,
power and wealth was always one-sided and the coast and
hinterland of China continually dictated the terms for bilateral
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political and trading relationships. That is why those Seas were
never comparable to the Mediterranean although geographically
they might have resembled the Mediterranean in some ways.
They were at best Semiterranean. But, with the coming of the
modern navies of the 19th century, power in the two China Seas
was for the fust time no longer one-sided in the continental
empire's favour. During that century, countervailing forces led
by Britain reversed that imbalance and, with that reversal,
China no longer faced out through Guangzhou. Instead, the
Western powers pressed inwards from the sea with Hong Kong
serving as Britain's fust base. In Asia, Japan woke up to that
change and its people quickly emulated and mastered the use of
maritime power. By the 20th century, Britain and Japan could
together lean on China with devastating consequences for
China.
Hong Kong played a role in helping the outside world lean
towards China after 1949. Under the Chinese Communist Party,
China sided with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and Hong
Kong served also as a frontline for the forces opposed to the
Sino-Soviet alliance, comparable to the role of West Berlin at
the other end of the global conflict. For more than 30 years,
Hong Kong was mainly a gateway into the closed Chinese
system but also intermittently an outlet for the PRC. It also
acted as a lever for transforming China by being the opposite of
communism, an open market economy that provided legal and
governance alternatives for its Chinese population.
This leaning in role was Hong Kong's position between
1949 and 1982 before the start of the Sino-British negotiations
for the return of Hong Kong to China. China had chosen not to
revert to the historical position of using Guangzhou as the
gateway for facing out but to keep a small open window in the
British colony. This gave Hong Kong its dual role and it
successfully played both roles for more than three decades.
However, the initiatives were always in the hands of the leaders
in China and Britain. The population of Hong Kong could only
respond. They leaned inwards to China and outwards to global
markets and cultures and made the most of what was decided
for them. As we know, many did well out of that exceptional
situation.
More recently, the United States replaced all the Great
Powers of the past as the determining force in the Asia-Pacific
region. For decades, it led the opposition to the spread of
Sino-Soviet influence. In that context, the ANZUS Treaty with
Australia and New Zealand, the US-Japan Alliance, and US
relations with Southeast Asia through the regional organisation
set up in the late 1960s called ASEAN, all led to a different
configuration of power off the shores of China. This
configuration based on the far end of the Pacific Ocean was one
that had never been seen before. During the Cold War, it was
not simply the West dominating the region as it had done for
two centuries, but the American superpower and its European
allies, together with Westernising or modernising Asian states,
seeking to consolidate a set of countervailing forces against
their ideological enemies. Since the 1990s, with China retooling
itself and the Soviet Union dissolved, the countervailing forces
have become more complex. They now include efforts to build
alliances to contain the spread of radical Islamist terrorism as
well as to ensure that China's continental power will not
overshadow the China Seas region in the way it did for
thousands of years. In other words, there is to be no return to
one-sided Semiterranean conditions. With modern technologies
shrinking the globe, the whole Asia-Pacific could be seen as a
larger Mediterranean that erected a maritime arc of forces off
the coast of China from Japan to Indonesia that acted as a
defense line behind which distant hinterlands could exert
overwhelming force to check Chinese power.
China's revival has been anticipated since the end of the
Second World War. But what that meant has been interpreted
differently by powerful leaders, for example, by Roosevelt and
Churchill in the 1940s and by Nixon and Kissinger in the 1970s.
Deng Xiaoping's views in the 1980s were especially cautious.
As for Japanese, Korean and Southeast Asian leaders since the
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1990s, their economic and political positions relative to China
changed dramatically and this has made their attitudes
uncertain and ambiguous. These changes have produced
challenges for Hong Kong. In particular, the rise of China taxed
Hong Kong's ability to serve China without reducing its need to
remain an open global city. This was obvious during the frrst
decade of Hong Kong as an SAR. As to be expected, there was
a shift of attention in the SAR towards China's interests. For
example, deeper involvement in the development of South
China has been encouraged to strengthen Hong Kong's recovery
after the fmancial crisis of 1998, although neither Beijing nor
Guangdong authorities would want that shift to go so far as to
affect the vital position of Guangzhou and Shenzhen for South
China. On the other hand, Hong Kong has worked hard to
retain its external links and underline its role as an international
city.
When reviewing the frrst decade of the SAR in an earlier
essay, I underlined Hong Kong's capacity to lean towards China
in new ways and re-position itself to deal with a changing world
outside. Hong Kong has proven its ability to lean in and face out
alternatively as well as simultaneously. Its people have crossed
several political, economic, social and cultural borders in the
past 150 years and there is no reason why they cannot do that
again and again. With that in mind, let me consider the role of
Hong Kong if China continues to rise and becomes the
dominant power in the region. Three questions deserve
attention:
1. What will such a powerful China want Hong Kong
for?
2. In what ways will the Asia-Pacific still need Hong
Kong?
3. What initiatives can Hong Kong take to retain its
importance?
China does not have political use for Hong Kong in matters
pertaining to defence and foreign affairs. That will not change.
However, every commentator notes that Hong Kong as a
financial centre is irreplaceable for a long while yet. It will also
remain invaluable as a transshipment centre and an entrepot for
South China, especially for the Pearl River delta. A powerful
China will continue to fmd Hong Kong invaluable for these two
roles. Beyond that, there will be less agreement. The basic fact is
that China can now reach out directly to the outside world
through many channels. It has developed strong communication
lines that face out and these are more varied and effective than
those that depended on Hong Kong in the past. Their ablest
people at the centre and in the major provincial capitals have
learnt almost all that they needed to learn from Hong Kong and
now see the SAR more as a residual problem than as an
essential gateway. Hong Kong needs to convince them that such
views about its role are short sighted.
One measure of China's interest lies in how far it expects
Hong Kong to lean inwards from now on. Not leaning in on
behalf of outside interests but leaning because the people can
identify more closely with China's interests. During the frrst
decade of the SAR, there is evidence of pressure being put on
Hong Kong to respond, pressure that was sometimes impatient
but mostly gentle. So far, Chinese leaders have been satisfied
with the pace of reconciliation. But the shift from expecting
Hong Kong to help China to helping Hong Kong to adjust to
the new reality is apparent. China does understand that Hong
Kong people will continue to face out because only in that way
can they preserve their sources of strength and ultimately their
autonomy. And it recognises that Hong Kong no longer needs
to do that for the sake of China.
But what about the kind of facing out that Hong Kong
could do that would bring the region closer to China? Southeast
Asia has not been as important to Hong Kong for markets and
fmancial capital than the developed G-8 nations. That is not
going to change, but China's position with regards to the
expansion of their markets worldwide has been totally
transformed. The reduced reliance on Hong Kong for that larger
world is obvious. However, the story within the region is
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different. For years, it was thought that the 'one country, two
system' model could be used to keep Taiwan interested in
reunification with the mainland. There is less talk about that
now and attention has turned elsewhere. More and more, China
interacts directly with Japan, Korea, Oceania and the countries
across the Pacific and less now through Hong Kong. If that
continues, in what ways will the Asia-Pacific still need Hong
Kong? This seminar has expert panels to flesh out the details of
what is likely to happen on the ground. My friend, Jusuf
Wanandi, will be providing his views on this subject in the
context of East Asian Regionalism. I shall therefore confme
myself to perceptions of Hong Kong's geographical and
political space.
I spoke about the power complex brought here in the 19th
century from the Mediterranean West and how that
transformed for more than a century the semiterranean
imbalance in China's relations with various polities across the
two China Seas. Those polities are alert to the possibility of a
return to the asymmetric political and economic conditions of
the past whenever China was united, rich and powerful. During
the transition from colony to nation in the region, many
national leaders continued to look at Hong Kong as the place to
lean in and help them open up their relations with China. They
now see that Hong Kong succeeded in that task only too well.
In Southeast Asia, the region has expanded ASEAN
membership to cover all ten southern states close to China. This
was at least partly in anticipation of China's inevitable rise.
Hong Kong's ties with each of the member states continued to
help strengthen economic links. But as ASEAN became more
active through the ASEAN Regional Forum, Chinese leaders
have turned to political measures to deal directly with the region.
The series of initiatives taken by Premier Zhu Rongji after Hong
Kong's reversion to China altered the conditions fundamentally
and China now sees the integration of the region as a priority
concern. It is providing the region with better direct access to
China and new centres in every province in the south have been
encouraged to engage with it. ASEAN agencies will not have to
lean towards China through Hong Kong, nor is it always
necessary for China to face out towards these countries and
their markets via Hong Kong.
The situatio~ with the larger Asia-Pacific region following
~he ~EC ~e~tmgs of the early 1990s is similar. Hong Kong's
mcluslon wIthm APEC was significant. But Malaysia's proposal
for an East Asian Economic Caucus offered alternative visions
and that fmally led to the idea of an East Asian Communi~
centred on ASEAN plus the three northeastern countries of
Japan, Korea and China. I leave it to Jusuf Wanandi to analyse
the future of that project. It is enough for me to say that it is still
work in progress, with additional members introduced at the
East Asian Summit: they are India, Australia and New Zealand.
And, not least, there is the shadow of the United States
hovering ?ver any effort at Asian regionalism like Banquo's
ghost at dmner. That exercise is part of the search for balance if
not symmetry that matches the Mediterranean complex that I
spoke of earlier, and is possible because the world is so much
smaller today. In that perspective, the Pacific has been
Mediterranean with a set of maritime relationships linking
Japan across the two China Seas to Indonesia to face the China
coasts opposit~ and now there is the possibility of extending
that to the IndIan Ocean as well. This strategic arc could serve
as the frontline for the larger Pacific region but, insofar as it is
still informal and not expected to diminish the position of
APEC or other regional organisations, it has no immediate
significance. But should it seek to contain China, it would
dam~ge APEC goals and render the role of Hong Kong
ambIvalent. Hong Kong's leverage in China remains useful for
all APEC members as long as trade and fmance issues remain
central. But the primacy of politics is evident in much of the
strategic thinking that has accompanied recent appraisals of
China's revived power. If that continues, it will reduce Hong
Kong's role in any kind of East Asian community.
The key changes outlined so far stress the dangers of Hong
Kong becoming marginalised in the new power relationships
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that are emerging. Let me now come to what Hong Kong can
do to retain its importance in the world. Clearly the people of
Hong Kong know how and where to lean inwards where China
is concerned. They have shown that they are supreme agents for
that work. What changes from time to time has been whom
they do the leaning for and what kinds of purposes are being
served. China is now keen for Hong Kong to lean inwards in
other ways and the new generation of businessmen and
professionals are even more skilled in doing just that. In
addition, there have been infusions of talented people from
China into Hong Kong who can reinforce the kinds of links
needed with the key power nodes in the PRC. If they work
together with their Hong Kong counterparts effectively, there
would be added capacity for Hong Kong to handle China's
affairs in the region. The issue is whether its skilled personnel
can convince Southeast Asian leaders, officials and
entrepreneurs that their countries and economies could do even
better through that integrated Hong Kong nexus. There are gaps
here in how the PRC and SAR governments function in the
ASEAN states and elsewhere. Hong Kong has its own trade
office, and its representatives are working efficiently among
well-established groups that look to Hong Kong. But the PRC
embassies act for China's expanding national and corporate
institutions and, in addition, also for many provincial, county
and local business interests that are reaching out in the region.
Embassy officials and expatriate businessmen are developing
expertise in order to catch up with Hong Kong's advantages and,
where they have won the trust of their host governments, have
now more extensive networks than Hong Kong.
At another level, Hong Kong has so far balanced its ability
to lean inwards to China with its extraordinary confidence in
facing out to deal with the rest of the world. There is no reason
why that confidence should not continue. What is significant is
that facing out today has many more facets than leaning in for
the purpose of enhancing foreign business opportunities and
fInancial networks in China. Facing out has never been solely to
meet commercial needs. On the contrary, Hong Kong's decades
of openness to British legal methods, education and cultural
values, and governance standards has been central to what
makes Hong Kong unique as an international city. Since the
1980s, other cultural features and intense debates about values
have gained ground as Hong Kong faced out more extensively
beyond Britain, notably to the United States and East Asia.
Economic success has meant that when Hong Kong faced out,
it systematically brought intangibles into Hong Kong like new
ideas and new standards, modern aesthetic as well as political
cultures, many of which can be seen as contrary to those found
in the PRC. Ideals of liberty and equality have made enormous
progress among the people and specific hopes that democracy
be introduced to a well-educated population have stayed high on
the agenda of many. In terms of Hong Kong's rights, this is
totally understandable. But China's rise and the uncertain
responses among China's neighbours could impose limits on
how Hong Kong faces out.
To illustrate what can happen, I would like to examine three
scenarios here. The fust two would impose constraints while the
third could offer new options for Hong Kong. The fust is that
China becomes the predominant power, obvious imbalance and
asymmetry return to the region, and the two China Seas
become semiterranean again as in the past. Hong Kong people
then have little choice but to lean further inwards, and confIne
their facing out activities to business, fInance and technological
expertise. At worst, they would have to discard their ideals and
aspirations that depend on the outside world. This scenario
could come to pass if the US decides that its interests elsewhere
are more important than the Asia-Pacific. Personally I consider
this unlikely unless, for reasons beyond its control, the US
economy weakens significantly relative to Asia and US leaders
choose to shore up its strengths in other regions.
The second is that the strategic Mediterranean arc, with the
US and its allies providing a distant hinterland for the countries
from Japan to Indonesia, becomes a permanent and hostile
balancing mechanism against the possibility of Chinese
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expansion. In that case, Hong Kong becomes an integral link in
China's chain of ports to defend its coastal interests. As
patriotic Chinese living on the coast of China, Hong Kong
people would have to surrender their autonomy and strongly
and unequivocally affirm their loyalty to China. There will be
little to face out for, and only room for more intensive efforts to
lean in. Again, I believe that this scenario is unlikely because
China is determined to befriend its southern and eastern
neighbours in the region and will do everything possible to
prevent miscalculations that would push these countries to join
such a chain to contain China. As long as China can continue
to grow its economy and can correct the fault-lines that threaten
internal social stability, no efforts to erect such a Mediterranean
strategic arc will be successful.
The third scenario follows from continued economic success
in China that leads to political reforms, reforms that are
introduced to save what is acknowledged to be an inefficient
and corruptible system. Chinese versions of democracy and
rights emerge that the world, including the United States and its
Western allies, is prepared to recognise as legitimate variations
of what is widely regarded as desirable for world peace. If the
Chinese leadership remains dedicated and confident, it is
possible to lay the foundation for long-term cooperative
relations in the region, and Hong Kong people will accept the
national political package as appropriate for China and
something they are content with. In such a scenario, Hong
Kong fmds balance. Its people could lean inwards profitably and
safely for the sake of both China and the outside world. At the
same time, they could face out freely in any way they choose in
the quest for new meaning in their lives. In such a condition of
balance, they would not have to worry whether they are leaning
in too far or facing out too much.
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